Consider trade in continuous time between two players. The gains from trade are divided according to a contract, and at each point in time, either player may unilaterally induce a costly adjustment of the contract. Players' payoffs from trade under the contract, as well as from trade under an adjusted contract, are exogenous and stochastic. We consider players' choice of whether and when to adjust the contract payment. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium in thresholds, where each player adjusts the contract whenever the contract payment relative to the outcome of an adjustment passes the threshold. There is strategic substitutability in the choice of thresholds, so that if one player becomes more active by choosing a threshold closer to unity, the other player becomes more passive.
Introduction
In most economies, a large part of the transactions take place within long-term relationships. Employment relationships, marriages, business partnerships are obvious examples. In general, there is a surplus from the relationship that is shared between the parties. The sharing of the surplus may depend on an explicit or implicit contract, or it may depend on some rules or habits. In any case, there is usually some rigidity in the contract or sharing rule, in the sense that it may be constant over a long time, until one player demands that it is changed.
An important question in this setting is under which circumstances a player will demand an adjustment of the contract. Furthermore, if one player is active, being eager to improve his payoff, how will this affect the behavior of the opponent? For concreteness, we consider a specific setting, where one player undertakes an exogenous service for the other, and where the remuneration for the service is given in a contract; an employment relationship is a good example. Trade takes place in continuous time.
A demand for adjustment of the contract may be caused by a change in the payoffs from trade that is to one player's disadvantage, or because the outside alternatives change. In our setting, these effects are captured by assuming that the able to set wages unilaterally. Thus it seems worthwhile to explore the alternative assumptions, that the timing of the contract renegotiation is endogenous and state-dependent, and that both players may affect the time when adjustment takes place.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on contract length, e.g., Danziger and Neuman (2005) on labor contracts and Bandiera (2007) on tenancy agreements. Most of this literature is concerned with the duration of fixed-length (or timedependent) contracts, empirically, or as seen from the point of optimality (e.g., in relation to investment incentives). In contrast, we let the length of the contract follow from optimal adjustment of the players.
Real world contracts of bilateral trade often specify an expiration date, seemingly making the decision of when to require an adjustment less relevant. However, as noted above, contracts may be renegotiated before any expiration date. Contracts may also be extended beyond the expiration date. In most European countries, the parties to a permanent employment contract are legally bound by the terms of the contract, unless the parties have agreed on a new contract, or one party has terminated the relationship, see Malcomson (1997) and Holden (1994) . Thus, even if there is an expiration date on the wage terms of the employment contract, the old wage prevails also after the expiration date, unless the parties have agreed to a change. In the sample of Israeli labor contracts studied by Danziger (1995) , 86 percent of all new contracts were signed after the expiration of the previous contract, with average delay of 213 days. Thus, the decision of when to adjust the contract is key.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is described in Section 2. We assume that the stochastic processes follow the exponential of a Lé vy processes. This is more general than most previous contributions, and it includes geometric Brownian motion as well as many other stochastic processes. We show that there exists no strategy that is better than a threshold strategy, specifying an adjustment of the contract whenever the ratio of the real contract payment to the real adjustment outcome passes a specific threshold. Section 3 derive formulaes for the expected objective functions, in the case when both players use threshold strategies. In Section 4, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium under the additional assumption that if there are jumps in the stochastic processes, the size of the jump is from a continuous, decreasing distribution. In Section 5, we show that if we also allow for jumps where the size of the distribution has a mass point for a fixed size, then Nash equilibrium still exists, but in this case it may require that agents randomize between two thresholds. In Section 6, we extend the basic model by allowing for a stage prior to the basic model, where players may invest in reducing the adjustment cost, and we consider the efficiency of this investment decision. Section 7 concludes. Approximate formulas for the equilibrium are given in Appendix C. Proofs are provided in Appendix D. 
The model
Formally, we consider a two-player differential game. There is a contract, according to which player B makes a fixed nominal payment Vðt i Þ per unit of time to player A, as a remuneration for some exogenous and unspecified service. The time when the payment is set, is denoted t i . At each point in time, either of the players may unilaterally adjust the nominal payment, inducing an adjustment cost on both players.
The real value of the contract payment at time t, Rðt; oÞ is found by deflating the nominal contract payment by the aggregate price level Q ðt; oÞ at time t, i.e., Rðt; oÞ ¼ Vðt i Þ=Q ðt; oÞ.
2 The parameter o denotes that Q ðt; oÞ and thus also Rðt; oÞ are stochastic. Players' flow payoffs are constant elasticity functions of the real contract payment, so that R Z A (i.e., R raised to the power Z A ) and R Z B are the flow payoffs of player A and B, respectively, where Z A 40 and Z B o 0 (implying that player A gains and player B loses from an increase in R). 3 This implies that both players have constant relative risk aversion, which is important to ensure an equilibrium with constant thresholds. The degree of risk aversion does not affect the qualitative results, but it has some impact on the numerical results, cf. simulations below. 4 If a player demands an adjustment of the contract at time t, the real value of the new contract is set equal to the real adjustment outcome Zðt; oÞ, which is also an exogenous stochastic process, see Section 2.1. The new nominal contract is thus Vðt; oÞ ¼ Zðt; oÞQðt; oÞ. Adjustment of the contract involves a fee that is proportional to the real adjustment outcome;
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1 In a working paper we also consider the case where only one player is allowed to adjust the contract, cf. Holden et al. (2005) . 2 If players agree on a contract in real terms, i.e., where V is continuously indexed to Q, this can be captured by setting Q ¼ 1 at all times, and the analysis below is unaffected. 3 A simple example of these payoff functions can be derived in a worker-firm framework. Let R ¼ V=Q be the real wage, and workers' flow payoff an increasing function of the real wage, R Z A . The firm has a constant returns to scale production function Y ¼ L, where Y is output and L is employment. Furthermore, the product demand facing the firm is Y ¼ ðP=Q Þ ÀE , where P is the product price and E 41 the elasticity of demand. The flow payoff of the firm is the real profit level, which is ðPY À VLÞ=Q . The profit maximizing price then satisfies the first order condition P ¼ ðE=ðE À 1ÞÞV. Substituting out for the first order condition in the profit function, we obtain the flow payoff of the firm as a decreasing isolelastic function of the real wage p ¼ CR 1ÀE , where
E þ 1 is a positive constant. Subject to an unimportant constant C, the flow payoff is then at the assumed form, where Z B ¼ 1 À E o 0. 4 Player A is risk averse or risk loving, depending on whether Z A is smaller than unity (payoff concave in R) or greater than unity (payoff convex in R).
The payoff of player B is convex in R, indicating a preference for risk. Note however that as a profit function in general is convex in prices, player B may well be a risk averse owner of a firm, with utility being a concave function of profits, of the form p s , where 0 o so1. With profits being defined as in footnote 3, the flow utility or payoff is then specifically, the adjustment fee is t n Z Z n , where t n (n ¼ A or B) is assumed to be strictly positive, deterministic and for simplicity independent of which player initiates the adjustment.
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Note that we do not consider the possibility that players care explicitly about the actions and intentions of the other player. Thus, we neglect that a player may care about an adjustment per se, viewing it as unfair or unwarranted; it is only the real contract payment and the adjustment costs that enter the payoff functions.
The overall objective function of the players is the discounted sum of flow payoffs, less the costs associated with adjusting the contract
where the discount rate b is positive and t j denote the times of contract adjustment. To avoid unimportant additional constants, we normalize by setting Rð0; oÞ ¼ Zð0; oÞ ¼ 1, and t 0 ¼ 0. As noted above, the players choose when to adjust the contract in order to maximize their objective function. At each time t, the contemporaneous values Zðt; oÞ and Q ðt; oÞ are known to the players, but the future values Zðs; oÞ and Q ðs; oÞ for s 4 t are unknown.
Most previous studies in the ðS; sÞ literature assume that the stochastic processes are continuous, e.g., according to a geometric Brownian motion. However, in real life situations, payoff functions may often be discontinues when important new events occur, or when new information is revealed. For instance, if player B signs a contract with a third party for delivery of the output produced by player A, this might induce a jump in the real adjustment outcome Z. To allow for such discontinuities, we assume that the real adjustment outcome and the aggregate price level are given by the exponential of a Lé vy process, i.e., that Zðs; oÞ ¼ expðFðs; oÞÞ and Q ðs; oÞ ¼ expðGðs; oÞÞ where F; G are Lé vy processes. Lé vy processes include Brownian motion, jump processes that follow a Poisson distribution and many other stochastic processes that are, e.g., asymmetric or have heavier tails, see the formal definition in Appendix A.
To ensure that the objective functions are finite, it is necessary to bound Z and Q relative to the discount rate b. This requires two additional assumptions, referred to as Definition A.2 in Appendix A, which we assume hold throughout the paper.
By assuming that payoff functions exhibit constant elasticity in the real contract payment R, and that the stochastic processes are given by the exponential of Lé vy processes, we ensure that the situation is the same after each adjustment, subject to a constant Zðt; oÞ. This property is crucial for the analysis, as it implies that the same strategies are optimal after each adjustment.
The strategy of a player is defined as a description of the criteria that apply when the player requires an adjustment of the contract. In principle, strategies may depend on anything that has happened in the history of the game. However, we will follow the tradition in the differential games literature and restrict our attention to Markov strategies, where the players' choice of action only depend on the state of the game. Thus, players may condition their play on the real contract payment R, the real adjustment outcome Z, or any combination of these variables. We do not allow players to condition their play on the opponent's play, except for any effect via the state variables R and Z. For example, we do not consider strategies where players punish a rapid adjustment by the opponent by another adjustment, inflicting further adjustment costs on both players. Let s n denote the Markov strategy of player n ¼ A; B. The times of contract adjustment t j for j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; are determined by the strategies s n , the value of the real contract payment Rðs; oÞ, and the real adjustment outcome Zðs; oÞ. Then each player n tries to maximize
The theorem below states that if one of the players uses a Markov strategy, there exists no strategy for the other player that gives higher expected value of the objective function than having a critical threshold for the ratio R=Z, i.e., adjusting the contract whenever R=Z is equal to or passes a certain threshold value. Other variables like R or Z separately, calendar time or the time duration since the previous adjustment, need not be used in the strategy.
Theorem 2.1. Assume that one player uses a Markov strategy. Then there exists no strategy for the other player that gives higher expected payoff than the payoff that can be obtained with a threshold strategy based on the ratio of the real contract payment R to the real adjustment outcome Z.
Given Theorem 2.1, we will in the sequel restrict attention to threshold strategies.
The renegotiation process
As explained above, our assumption that each of the players may unilaterally adjust the contract payment can be given two interpretations. Either there exists a reopening clause in the contract, or a player may induce a renegotiation process
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5 Our assumption of proportional adjustment fees, adjusted for the constant elasticity Z n , yields tractable solutions. It also seems plausible. For example, in a labor contract, adjustment costs may reflect time spent on bargaining, and the real contract payment (i.e., the real wage) seems an appropriate measure of the costs of time.
by unilaterally disrupting trade, or by threatening to do so. The outcome of a renegotiation process of an existing contract is an interesting and complicated problem, cf. previous analysis in Haller and Holden (1990) , Fernandez and Glazer (1991) , MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Holden (1997 Holden ( , 1999 . In general, the bargaining outcome will depend on the size of the surplus that is to be shared, the players' preferences, the outside alternatives, and the costs associated with a dispute in the bargaining. Some or all of these variables may vary over time, and thus lead to changes in the bargaining outcome. However, a proper analysis of this is far beyond the scope of the present study. Thus, we restrict ourselves to a reduced form approach. Specifically, we assume that the renegotiation process is costly to both players, as specified above. Furthermore, we assume that there is a unique outcome Z to the renegotiation process.
Observe that our specification with an exogenous adjustment outcome Z does not affect our analysis of optimal threshold strategies. At each point in time, Z is the outcome if one of the players requires an adjustment of the contract. Players cannot affect Z, except by choosing when to adjust the contract. Thus, as seen from the point of view of the players when they make the decision of whether to induce an adjustment, which is the problem that we study, the adjustment outcome Z is exogenous. This might have been different if we had allowed for players being able to commit to their future threshold level. Then, one would expect that the future thresholds would affect the adjustment outcome, and it would have been necessary to incorporate the effect of the choice of thresholds on the adjustment outcome in the analysis. However, by the Markov assumption, players cannot commit to their future threshold values.
An important limitation of letting the adjustment outcome be exogenous is however that we do not capture how a change in a parameter in the model would affect the adjustment outcome. Thus, in our analysis in Theorem 4.1 below, and the subsequent numerical simulations, we do not capture that a change in the parameters might be expected to affect the renegotiation process, and thus the real adjustment outcome. Hence, these exercises should be interpreted as ceteris paribus-analyses, where we explore the direct effect of the change in the parameters on the thresholds, neglecting any possible effect on the real adjustment outcome.
The model when both players use thresholds strategies
In this section we derive formulas for the expected objective functions and their derivatives, given that players use threshold strategies. These formulas can be computed numerically, and possibly also analytically, for specific stochastic processes. To illustrate the model, Fig. 1 shows a realization of the real contract payment R when both players use threshold strategies. Given the thresholds, define the expected contribution to the objective function of player n from the start at t ¼ 0 to the first contract adjustment,
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The expected flow payoff just after the first adjustment, discounted down to time t ¼ 0, is defined by
Note that in the special case where the real adjustment outcome Z is a constant, h n is a pure discount factor. Note also that the second inequality in Definition A.2 ensures that h n o1. Then we may formulate the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that both players use threshold strategies, implying that the contract is adjusted as soon as the contract payment relative to the adjustment outcome R=Z exits the interval ðr A ; r B Þ. Then the following properties hold:
The expected values of the objective functions immediately after an adjustment satisfy
and are defined for 0rr A o1 o r B r1.
(ii) Assuming EfTðr A ; r B Þg is differentiable, then f n , h n u n are differentiable and the derivatives satisfy
Eq. (6) captures the opposing effects of increasing the thresholds: for example, increasing r A reduces the expected time until the next adjustment. This will reduce the expected payoff until the next adjustment, i.e., @f n =@r A o0. Furthermore, reducing the expected time until the next adjustment raises the discount factor @h n =@r A 4 0, reflecting that the adjustment cost t n is incurred earlier, but also that the value of the objective function after an adjustment u n is received earlier.
Nash equilibrium
In this section we prove existence of a Nash equilibrium in thresholds, and we explore how the equilibrium depends on some of the parameters of the model.
Define the optimal thresholds for player A, as a function of the threshold for player B, m A ðr B Þ, and similarly for player B, m B ðr A Þ, as follows: These definitions allow for the possibility that the optimal threshold is not unique, in which case they pick the most lenient value, i.e., the threshold farthest from unity. However, in Theorem 4.1 below, we show that with the assumptions mentioned above then the optimal threshold is indeed unique.
We may then state the following theorem regarding uniqueness of the optimal value and the existence of an equilibrium point. Theorem 4.1 states a number of key results. First, part (ii) shows that both players have unique best response functions in the form of thresholds r n . The optimal threshold reflects two opposing concerns. A threshold very close to unity is costly due to frequent renegotiations, while a threshold far from unity involves the risk of lengthy periods with a bad contract payment.
Second, and more importantly, part (v) shows that there exists a Nash equilibrium in thresholds. Thus, in equilibrium, player A will demand an adjustment whenever R=Z is below player A's threshold r A , irrespective of whether this is caused by high inflation eroding the real value of the contract payment, or by an increase in the real adjustment outcome. Conversely, player B will require an adjustment whenever R=Z is above player B's threshold r B . An adjustment will ensure that R is set equal to Z, implying that the ratio R=Z ¼ 1.
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Third, Theorem 4.1(iv) reveals that higher adjustment costs make a player more reluctant to require an adjustment, by pushing his threshold value further from unity, r A down for player A, and r B up for player B. This is as expected: players weigh the gains from improving the contract against the costs of doing so, and higher costs make players more reluctant to require an adjustment. Fourth, part (i) shows that if one player becomes more active (that is, has a threshold closer to unity), this reduces the expected value of the objective function for the opponent. Again, the result is intuitive: when one player becomes more active, the opponent loses from both more frequent costly adjustments and from the fact that the contract on average becomes less favorable for the opponent.
Fifth, and again more important, Theorem 4.1(iii), identifies strategic substitutability in the choice of thresholds. This follows from the optimal thresholds m A ðr B Þ and m B ðr A Þ being increasing functions. If, in equilibrium, one player becomes more active by choosing a threshold closer to unity, the other player becomes more passive by choosing a threshold further from unity. In other words, if, say, the adjustment fee of player B is reduced, making him more active, this will induce player A to become more passive.
At first glance, this result might be surprising. If the threshold of my opponent is close to unity, so that he is very active, demanding an adjustment whenever the contract is slightly favorable to me, surely I should also be more active, to prevent that the contract is almost always to my disadvantage? Yet this argument is misleading. If my opponent becomes more active, this is clearly a disadvantage to me. However, becoming more active would not help. The relevant issue is that as my opponent becomes more active, the expected time until he will demand an adjustment is reduced. This implies that if I were to induce a renegotiation, the expected duration of the novel contract payment will be shorter than before, as the opponent is more active. This makes it less attractive for me to require an adjustment, leading me to be more passive, with a threshold further from unity.
The strategic substitutability effect is in contrast to Andersen and Christensen (2002) , who find strategic complementarity in the choice of thresholds. Their finding of complementarity is due to the fact that they consider only one contract adjustment, implying an incentive for players to preempt the opponent. Thus, if one player is active, 7 We have not been able to prove uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the general case, nor have we been able to construct cases with multiple Nash equilibria with the assumptions in Theorem 4.1. Thus, for each set of stochastic processes, it is necessary to verify that there is only one equilibrium point.
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the opponent has an incentive to also be active, to increase the likelihood of being the player who obtains the advantage of asking for an adjustment at a suitable moment. Andersen and Christensen (1997) consider the model with a finite, but large number of contract renewals, but it is not stated whether the strategic complementarity holds in that model.
The model may be generalized to the case where the adjustment costs t A and t B depend on which player that requires contract adjustment. In Eqs. (5) and (6), this would require that t n is replaced by the expected value of the contract adjustment fee, which again would be a function of r A and r B . Theorem 4.1 is also valid in the generalized model, but in Eq. (D.8) in the proof and the calculations leading to this equation, t A would be the adjustment fee when player A requires an adjustment. t B would be used in the corresponding equation for B. The model may also be generalized to allow for the adjustment fees being stochastic, where t n is the expected value of the adjustment fee.
Numerical simulations
As will become clear below, the model involves several strongly non-linear relationships. Thus, to explore the properties of the model further, numerical simulations are necessary. Fig. 2 illustrates the game in setting thresholds. The curves show the best response functions m A and m B for different values of adjustment fees t n . Higher adjustment fee leads to more passive play, with critical values further from unity (curves down). The best response functions are downwardsloping in the r A ; 1=r B space, reflecting strategic substitutability in the sense that players will be more passive (lower values of r A or 1=r B ) if the opponent becomes more active (higher values of r A or 1=r B ). Note that the best-response functions are highly non-linear, implying that the effect of the strategic substitutability will vary sharply depending on the initial conditions.
The intersections of the best response functions indicate Nash equilibria. For example, point C in Fig. 2 Then the strategic substitutability effect implies that player B becomes more passive, so that his critical threshold increases from 4 percent to 8.2 percent. Given the complex effects with strong non-linearities, it is important to explore the properties of the model by use of simulations. We have undertaken extensive simulations, along several dimensions, and Tables 1 and 2 sum up the key results.
As noted above, the basic framework is symmetric in the sense that if the stochastic processes are symmetric (i.e., Z and Z À1 have the same properties, and so do Q and Q À1 ), and Z A ¼ À Z B , then the behavior will also be symmetric, implying that r A ¼ 1=r B . For example, this would be the case if Z and Q were geometric Brownian motions without drift. In the numerical simulations, we will therefore focus on the effects of asymmetries between the players. In almost all simulations, we include a positive drift a q 40 in the aggregate price level Q, implying a tendency that the real value of the contract payment, R, falls over time, relative to the real adjustment outcome, Z. Thus, it will usually be player A (the seller) who demands an adjustment, unless the critical threshold of player B is close to unity. Note that the drift may be interpreted as anything that makes the real value of the contract payment fall relative to the adjustment outcome. For example, if one interprets the contract as a trade agreement between two countries, higher growth in one country inducing a gradual improvement in the country's bargaining position, might also be captured by such drift. Table 1 displays Nash equilibria for various combinations of adjustment costs. We observe that an increase in the adjustment costs for one player makes this player less active, which increases the expected utility of the opponent, and in addition makes the opponent more active (strategic substitutability). An implication of the strategic substitutability is that asymmetries between the players may be exacerbated. Thus, if the adjustment cost of one player becomes higher, making this player more passive, the opponent becomes more active. However, when the opponent becomes more active, the first player responds by becoming even more passive. In some cases, the strategic effect may be substantial. Table 2 shows the effect of variation in other parameters, where the first row gives the benchmark simulation. 8 Greater volatility a q makes both players more reluctant to require an adjustment, with thresholds further away from unity, cf. row 2. The intuition is straightforward: With greater volatility, thresholds close to unity will imply too frequent adjustments, thus players are less active so as to reduce adjustment costs. This result is the same as derived by Andersen and In all simulations, t A ¼ t B ¼ :07, while the other parameters as in Table 1 . 8 When interpreting the effects of parameter changes, one should recall that Z is exogenous, implying that we do not capture any effect on this variable. As argued in Section 2.1, endogenizing Z would not affect the optimal threshold values, but in general it would affect the payoffs of the players. Thus, these effects should be treated more cautiously. The average real value of the contract would also be directly affected by endogenizing Z, thus we do not calculate the effect of parameter changes on this variable.
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Christensen (2002) . Note, however, from the last column that the change in behavior is not so large that it prevents that the expected time between adjustments, EfTg, falls. Increased drift in the aggregate price level, which, as mentioned above, causes a reduction in the flow payoff of player A (the seller) over time, has a positive impact on the threshold of player B. As the drift increases from a q ¼ 0 to :006, r B increases from 1.020 to 1.028, cf. rows 1, 3 and 4 in Table 2 . This reflects that under high inflation (high drift), player B need not demand a adjustment even if he has been ''unlucky'' with the random movement, so that the contract payment is high relative to the adjustment payment. As the contract payment is set in nominal terms, high inflation will fairly soon reduce the real value of the contract payment, so player B need not incur the costs of an adjustment. In contrast, when there is little or no drift, player B cannot rely on this effect and must set the threshold level closer to unity to avoid a bad contract value. This result is in contrast to the findings of Andersen and Christensen (2002) , where increased drift makes player B (which corresponds to the principal in their model) more active. Their result is due to their assumption of only one renegotiation; if there is drift that is disadvantageous to the principal, there will be less reason for the principal to postpone an adjustment in the hope of a more favorable adjustment a later stage. Indeed, in Andersen and Christensen (1997) , it is shown that the effect of drift is ambiguous in the case where it is allowed for many renegotiations.
The threshold of player A is non-monotonic in the drift. Increasing the drift from a q ¼ 0, via a q ¼ :0022:006 yields r A equal to .969, .971 and .969, respectively. The non-monotonicity reflects two opposing effects. On the one hand, stronger drift implies that for a given threshold, adjustments will be more frequent, so that the total costs incurred from adjustment increase. To reduce the rise in costs from frequent adjustments, player A will be more reluctant to demand an adjustment, thus the threshold is decreased. On the other hand, the strategic substitutability in the choice of thresholds implies that when higher drift increases the threshold of player B, making him less active, it also increases the threshold of player A. Intuitively, increasing the threshold of player B raises the expected duration of an beneficial adjustment by player A, making an adjustment more attractive to A.
Risk aversion for player A, i.e., reducing Z A below unity, has a negative effect on the thresholds of both players, player A's further away from unity and player B's closer to unity, cf. row 5. Thus, risk aversion makes player A more reluctant to require an adjustment, inducing player B to become more active. We also see that player B obtains higher expected utility when player A is more risk averse, corresponding to the well-known result that it is advantageous to bargain with a risk averse player. One possible interpretation of risk aversion for the seller is a union that is also concerned about the risk of unemployment, if wages become very high. Under this interpretation, our results suggest that unions that care about employment are less active (in the sense of having a threshold further from unity), thus improving the payoff for the firm.
Likewise, making player B less risk loving, by reducing the absolute value of Z B , improves the situation for player A, as the threshold of both players increases, making player A more active and player B more passive, resulting in an increase in the expected utility of player A, cf. row 6. Combining the effect of the various parameters allows for interesting observations in relation to the literature on downward nominal wage rigidity. As observed by Akerlof et al. (1996) and Lebow et al. (2003) (the latter paper also surveys more recent evidence), nominal wage cuts are fairly rare, even in a low inflation economy, suggesting that firms rarely require a downward adjustment in nominal wages. The third row shows that if adjustments costs are symmetric, and there is no drift (i.e., no inflation and no productivity growth, implying no trend increase in wages) player B, which corresponds to an employer, undertakes most of the adjustments (recall that PðÁÞ shows the fraction of all adjustments that are induced by player A), implying that wage cuts would in fact be more common than wage increases. The reason for this asymmetry lies in the asymmetry in the payoff functions, where Z A ojZ B j. This property reflects that profits are a convex function of wages; by the envelope theorem, the derivative of the profit function with respect to wages is equal to the employment level, and the employment is itself a decreasing function of wages.
However, as noted above the evidence indicates that wage cuts are fairly rare, which implies that other mechanisms must be so strong that they more than overturns the effect of the profit function being convex. One effect in this direction is drift in wages, due to inflation, productivity growth or both. Holding first thresholds values constant, inflation erodes the real value of the contract payment, implying that the threshold of player A, the seller or worker, will bind more often, thus he will make most of the adjustments. As showed above, with optimal thresholds, the drift makes player B, the buyer or firm, less active, further reducing the incidence of wage cuts. The effect on player A's behavior is ambigous, as the direct effect of inflation is less active play by player A (active play and high inflation will lead to too frequent costly adjustment), while strategic substitutability effect implies that the less active player B makes player A more active.
A numerical example may be illustrative. If the drift equals a q ¼ :002, which corresponds to annual wage growth of 2.4 percent if the unit of time is one month, this leads to an incidence of wage cuts of 31 percent (1 À :69 ¼ :31), cf. the first row in Table 2 . In comparison, Lebow et al. (2003) report in the years with low median wage growth of an annual median of 2.3 percent (the years were 1987, 1993, and 1995) , 18 percent of all wage changes in the US Employment cost index were negative. This suggests that there are also other mechanisms preventing nominal wage cuts, for example that firms believe that wage cuts may have an adverse effect on workers' morale, cf., e.g., Akerlof et al. (1996) or Bewley (1999) . Note that if firms for some reason find it more costly to cut wages and thus become more reluctant to do so, the strategic substitutability effect will make workers more active, which will magnify the downward rigidity of wages.
Weaker assumptions on the stochastic processes
As noted above, in real life situations, payoff functions may often be discontinues when important new events occur, or when new information is revealed. Thus, it is of interest to see to what extent our results are robust to discontinuities in the stochastic processes. So far, we have assumed that if there are jumps in the Z and Q-processes, the size of the jumps is from a continuous decreasing distribution. In this section we also allow for jumps in Z where the distribution for the jumps has a mass point for a fixed size, implying that EfTðr A ; r B Þg is not differentiable. We show that in this case a Nash equilibrium may in some specific cases only exists if one of the players uses a mixed strategy. The reason is that this may give discontinuities in the optimal responses m A ðr B Þ and m B ðr A Þ implying that they do not intersect. Then there will be no Nash equilibrium with constant threshold strategies. However, there will exist a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, in the sense that one player randomizes between two threshold values. From a theoretical point of view it is interesting to see that if we expand the class of stochastic processes Z and Q to include a wider class of jumps, then it is necessary to include randomization in the strategies in order to obtain Nash equilibrium. To illustrate this, we construct a stylized example where there is a possibility that the real adjustment outcome Z may take a large fall, which may lead player B to require an adjustment to reduce the contract payment down to the new, low value of Z.
Example 5.1. Assume that the aggregate price level Q is constant, except for sudden increases according to a high intensity Poisson process, where the size of the increases are ''small'' and according to a continuous distribution. The real adjustment outcome Z is also constant except for ''large'' discrete decreases at a fixed rate 1 þ r, according to a low intensity Poisson process. These assumptions imply that the ratio of the contract payment relative to the adjustment outcome R=Z is decreasing, except for sudden jumps where it increases with the percentage r.
Consider the situation if player B has chosen a threshold r B o1 þ r. Then, if Z decreases immediately after an adjustment, R=Z will be above the critical threshold of player B, inducing an immediate adjustment by B. Thus, player A will not benefit from a period with high R=Z after the decrease in Z. On the other hand, if player A let R=Z fall below r B =ð1 þ rÞ, R=Z will be below the threshold of the player B even after a decrease in Z. There will be no immediate adjustment, and player A will benefit from a period of high R=Z. This discontinuity at r B =ð1 þrÞ will imply a discontinuity in m A , i.e., in the optimal threshold of player A. In this example EfTðr A ; r B Þg is differentiable except for the curve r A ¼ r B =ð1 þ rÞ where there is a discontinuity in @EfTðr A ; r B Þg=@r n . The situation is illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4. In equilibrium, player A randomizes between two thresholds r 1 % :979 and r 2 % :971. Fig. 3 shows that R=Z decreases monotonically, except when it increases to unity at an adjustment, or increases above unity when Z decreases. Fig. 4 illustrates the strategic effects. For values of r B above r 3 % 1:035 % 1=:966, the optimal threshold of player A, r A is increasing in r B due to the strategic effect discussed in Section 4. For r B or 3 % 1:035, a fall in Z will always induce player B to adjust, implying that player A sets r A % :979. However, for r B ¼ r 3 % 1:035, player A is indifferent between choosing a low threshold r 1 , maintaining the possibility of benefiting from a fall in Z, and a high threshold r 2 , which removes this possibility. In equilibrium, player A mixes between these two thresholds, with probabilities ensuring that it is indeed optimal for player B to choose the threshold r B ¼ r 3 % 1:035.
Let us now consider the consequences when the distribution for the jumps has a mass point for a fixed size more formally. Define S n as the class of strategies for a player n, where the player randomizes between two thresholds r 1 and r 2 , where r 1 is chosen with probability 1 À q and r 2 with probability q. Note that S n includes pure strategies, where q ¼ 0. Let s n 2 S n denote a strategy. Furthermore, we assume that each time R=Z is equal to unity or jumps from one side of unity to the other side of unity, players select one of the two thresholds at random. This procedure ensures that past fluctuations of Z and Q have no impact on the probability each player perceives of the thresholds of the opponent.
We extend the definition of the expected values of the objective functions u n to allow for randomization by both players. Furthermore, we define the optimal threshold for each player when the opponent randomizes: 
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In order to prove existence of a Nash equilibrium, we assume that m n is piecewise continuous and that m c n is continuous in each of the discontinuities in m n . This is a property of the stochastic processes Z and Q, but it will be fulfilled except in extreme cases. For example, it will not be fulfilled if Z or Q only take discrete values. We may then formulate the more general theorem for the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.2. Assume m n is piecewise continuous and m c n is continuous in each of the discontinuities in m n . Then there exists at least one Nash-equilibrium point in which at most one player randomizes.
When the stochastic processes are discontinuous, we are able to construct examples where there exist multiple Nash equilibria. In Fig. 5 , there are two Nash equilibria with constant thresholds, and one with randomization.
Efficiency of the choice of adjustment costs
In this section, we extend the model by allowing an additional stage of the model, taking place ahead of the basic model, where each of the players may invest in adjustment capacity, reducing his costs of adjustment of the contract. For example, a firm may have a large salary department, taking care of the wage negotiations. Let the costs of obtaining adjustment fee t n be given by the function c n ðt n Þ, where we assume that c n is differentiable and strictly decreasing, and that c n converges to infinity when t n converges to zero, and c n converges to zero when t n converges to infinity. For simplicity, we assume that c n approaches zero sufficiently fast when t n increases to ensure that Eqs. (7) and (8) With a slight abuse of notation, let W n ðt A ; t B Þ denote the expected value of the objective function of player n, derived from Nash equilibrium in the basic model with adjustment fees t A and t B . Fig. 3 . Two realization of R=Z for the same stochastic process, but corresponding to two different thresholds for player A, r 2 ¼ :971 and r 1 ¼ :979, in Example 5.1. Player B has threshold r B ¼ r 3 ¼ 1:035. Threshold r 1 gives adjustment after every jump where R=Z increases, while the lower threshold r 2 may give periods with high R=Z values. In a Nash equilibrium, illustrated in Fig. 4 , player A randomizes between the thresholds r 2 and r 1 . The two independent Lé vy processes Z and Q are constants except for discrete changes according to a Poisson process. The Poisson process for Z has intensity .8 and in the changes, Z decreases with a factor 1.0625. The Poisson process for Q has intensity approximately 1200 and in the changes, Q increases according to a continuous distribution such that EflnðQ ðtÞÞg % :13t and VarflnðQ ðt; oÞÞg % :004t. Furthermore, t A ¼ :0017 and t B ¼ :0057. The process is modeled with time step :001. 9 We do not wish to go into issues of equilibrium selection here, so if there are multiple Nash equilibria, we assume that players observe a signal indicating which equilibrium applies. Associating probabilities with the various Nash equilibria, players take the expected value of the objective functions.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
When both players optimize their investment in adjustment capacity, the adjustment fees are given by the first order conditions
Assuming for simplicity that overall welfare can be measured by the sum of players' expected utility, the welfare maximizing levels of investment in adjustment capacity is given by
From Theorem 4.1, it follows that the expected value of the objective function for a player is increasing in the opponent's cost of adjusting the contract, i.e., that @W A =@t B 40 and @W B =@t A 40. This follows from Theorem 4.1, part (iv), showing that higher adjustment costs makes a player more passive (threshold further from unity), and part (i) showing that a player gains from his opponent becoming more passive. Thus, it follows that the values of t n that satisfy (7) give positive values when put into the left-hand side of Eq. (8). This implies that for each solution of (7), there exists a solution of (8) with higher values of t n . This implies that when each player determines the adjustment fee from (7), there is an overinvestment in adjustment capacity compared to a solution of Eq. (8).
This over-investment in adjustment capacity is due to the following. First, each of the players do not take into consideration that the contract payment in our setting is only a matter of a transfer between the players, so that what one player gains by adjusting the payment is directly linked to what the other player loses. Second, the first effect is exacerbated by the strategic substitutability in the choice of thresholds. By investing in adjustment capacity, thus reducing the adjustment fee, the threshold of the player is moved closer to unity, leading the other player to choose a threshold further away from unity. The player gains from both changes, i.e., both from lowering his own adjustment fee, and from inducing the opponent to set a threshold further away from unity. 

Concluding remarks
The assumption that wages and prices are sticky in nominal terms plays a key role in macro and monetary economics. However, usually the timing of price adjustment is taken as exogenous. This has motivated a considerable literature studying the optimal adjustment of prices under stochastic evolution of money or aggregate prices. In this paper we extend this analysis by considering bilateral adjustment, where both parties to the trade, both the seller and buyer, are allowed to require adjustments of the contract.
We show that several of the key results from the literature on unilateral price adjustment also hold in the more general case of bilateral adjustment. Optimal behavior is characterized by threshold strategies, where players demand adjustment whenever they can improve the contract terms by a certain percentage, i.e., whenever the real contract payment, R, is too far away relative to the outcome of an adjustment of the contract, Z. Player A (the seller) adjusts whenever R=Zrr A o 1, while player B (the buyer) requires adjustment whenever R=ZZr B 4 1. As expected, higher volatility and larger adjustment costs make players more reluctant to demand an adjustment, implying threshold values further from unity.
Under rather general assumptions, even allowing for discontinuities in the stochastic processes, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in thresholds. When we extend the class of stochastic processes further, it is necessary to include randomization in the strategies to obtain Nash equilibrium. A second main result is that in equilibrium, there is strategic substitutability in players' choice of threshold: if one player becomes more active, setting a threshold closer to unity, the other player becomes more passive, setting a threshold further from unity.
The basic economic setting we analyze has previously been studied by Andersen and Christensen (2002) . However, they focus on only one adjustment, while we consider more general stochastic processes, allowing for an unlimited number of adjustments. Our allowing for an unlimited number of adjustments is important for several of the key results. For example, the strategic substitutability is in contrast to the finding of Andersen and Christensen (2002) .
The strategic substitutability may exacerbate asymmetries. If the adjustment costs of one player, say A, are reduced, this player will respond by raising the threshold closer to unity. However, this effect will be strengthened by player B raising his threshold, becoming more passive, further away from unity. Numerical simulations indicate that the strategic effect in some cases is substantial, depending on the initial conditions.
If there is drift in the stochastic processes, one player will make most of the adjustments. The drift will make the opponent more passive, in the form of a threshold further from unity, as any gain from adjustment is likely to be ARTICLE IN PRESS short-lived and thus small, due to the drift. As the opponent becomes more passive, the strategic substitutability will make the first player more active, amplifying the effect of the drift.
One application of these effects is that if there is both a positive drift in the form of a rising price level, and costs to the firm of cutting nominal wages (e.g., adverse effects on workers' morale), these effects will work to make the firm more passive. The workers will then respond by becoming more active in pushing wages up, thus magnifying the initial asymmetric effect. This magnifying effect, which to our knowledge is novel in the literature, suggests that even small costs of cutting wages may be sufficient to ensure that only a fairly small part of all nominal wage changes are negative.
We also find that a risk averse player will be more passive, setting a threshold further from unity, thus benefiting the opponent. In contrast, a risk loving player will be more active, with adverse effects on the opponent.
Throughout the analysis, the outcome of an adjustment of the contract, Z, is taken as exogenous. This does not affect our analysis of the optimal adjustment behavior, i.e., players' choice of thresholds. By the Markov assumption, players' strategies can only depend on the state variables. Thus, while the players decide when the adjustment takes place, they cannot affect the outcome of the adjustment by their choice of thresholds.
10 However, by taking the adjustment outcome as exogenous when we vary parameter values in the numerical simulations, we do not capture the effect of these parameters on the adjustment outcome. Our simulations should consequently be viewed as ceteris paribus-exercises, showing the direct effect of parameter changes on optimal thresholds for adjustment, but keeping the adjustment outcome constant.
We extend the basic model by introducing a stage prior to the model, where players may invest in ''adjustment ability'', in the sense that they may reduce their own costs of undertaking an adjustment (e.g., by having a personnel department doing the wage negotiations). We then find that players will over-invest as compared to the socially efficient level. The over-investment arises for two reasons. First, players demand an adjustment too often from a social point of view, as they do not take into consideration that their own gain from better contract terms is reflected in a loss by the opponent. By investing to lower one's own adjustment costs, a player will demand an adjustment more often, thus hurting the other player. Second, the strategic substitutability mentioned above exacerbates the first effect. By reducing one's own adjustment costs, a player becomes more active. This makes the opponent more passive, which adds to the gain of the first player, as an adjustment induced by the opponent becomes less likely.
Our analysis is cast in a specific, but important setting, namely state-dependent adjustment of a nominal contract between two players, e.g., a labor contract or a tenancy agreement. This analysis seems relevant for research on macromodels with sticky wages and prices. While a number of recent contributions have introduced state dependent pricing (see references in the Introduction), contributions with state dependent wage setting, allowing both parties to require an adjustment, are still missing. Hopefully, our analysis could be helpful in future work on this issue.
We also believe that our analysis has wider applications. For example, the gain from trade between two countries may depend on the trade agreement that prevails between the countries. If one country perceives adjustment of the agreement as less costly than the other, the former country will be more active in the sense of being willing to adjust the agreement even when only a small improvement is possible. Alternatively, if the relative strength of the countries changes over time, the adverse drift will make the losing country more passive. Our finding of strategic substitutability in thresholds suggests that these forms of asymmetry will be exacerbated, in the sense that the active behavior of one country and the passive behavior of the other will reenforce each other. This exacerbating of asymmetries resembles the finding of Haller and Holden (1997) , where it is shown that asymmetries in the bargaining positions of two countries over an international treaty may be exacerbated by the country with the ''stronger'' bargaining position setting a stricter super-majority ratification requirement, thus magnifying the effect of the strong bargaining position.
An important restriction of our model is that the gains from trade are taken to be exogenous. If the gain from trade could be affected by player's investment or effort decisions, it would be important to design the contract so as to sustain efficiency. MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) show that simple contracts with rigid contract payment may induce efficiency in some cases. An interesting avenue for future research would be to explore the efficiency properties of a simple nominal contract in a dynamic, stochastic environment, by an appropriate extension of the present model. Definition A.1 (Lévy process). A stochastic process X t is a Lé vy process provided the following conditions hold: (i) For any n and any 0rt 0 o Á Á Á o t n the random variables X t 0 ; X t 1 À X t 0 ; . . . ; X tn À X t nÀ1 are independent.
(ii) X 0 ¼ 0 almost surely. (iii) The distribution of X s þ t À X s is independent of s.
(iv) The process is stochastically continuous, i.e., lim tk0 Prob ðjX t j 4eÞ ¼ 0 for all e40.
(v) The process is right-continuous with left limits.
For Lé vy processes we have the Lé vy-Khintchine formula for the characteristic function of X t (see, e.g., Sato, 1999) 
where ds is a sÀfinite measure, denoted the Lé vy-measure, with R 1 À1 minðjxj 2 ; 1Þ dsðxÞ o 1 and sðf0gÞ ¼ 0. The process is uniquely defined by the quantities ða; a; dsÞ. The measure s describes the size and intensity of the jumps in the process. The process is Gaussian if and only if s ¼ 0, and in that case, a denotes the drift and a the volatility. If s satisfies
we may conclude that
ðe Zx À 1 À Zxw fjxjr1g ðxÞÞ dsðxÞÞ holds and is finite.
To ensure that the objective functions are finite, it is necessary to bound Z and Q relative to the discount rate b. This requires two additional assumptions. First, we assume that the volatility of the non-Gaussian part is bounded, by assuming that the Lé vy-measures satisfy Z 1 1 e Z h x ds h ðxÞ o1; h ¼ z; q ðA:2Þ
for some Z h . We may then define the drift in the processes for the real adjustment outcome Z and the aggregate price level
ðe Z n x À 1 À Z n xw fjxjr1g ðxÞÞ ds h ðxÞ; Z n rZ h ;
for n ¼ A; B and h ¼ z; q. We have that EfZ Z n ðtÞg ¼ expðtm n;z Þ and EfQ Z n ðtÞg ¼ expðtm n;q Þ. For example, m A;z is the expected rate of increase in the real adjustment payment, adjusted for the relative rate of risk aversion of player A Z A . The second assumption is that the drift parameters m n;h must be bounded by the discount rate b.
Definition A.2 (Property F ). We say that the stochastic contract model has property F if the following properties hold:
(i) The real adjustment outcome Zðs; oÞ ¼ expðFðs; oÞÞ and Q ðs; oÞ ¼ expðGðs; oÞÞ where F and G are Lé vy processes given by ða z ; a z ; ds z Þ and ða q ; a q ; ds q Þ, respectively.
(ii) There exists Z h such that
and assume that Z n rZ h for n ¼ A; B and h ¼ z; q.
(iii) We have that m n;h o b; n ¼ A; B; h ¼ z; q:
Appendix B. Analytic expression-an example
In special cases it is possible to find analytic expressions for some of the variables. Assume the real adjustment outcome relative to the real contract payment is given by a geometric Brownian motion Zðt; oÞ=Rðt; oÞ ¼ Zðt; oÞQðt; oÞ ¼ expðða À a 2 =2Þt þ aB t ðoÞÞ where the notation is simplified by the normalization Zð0; oÞQð0; oÞ ¼ 1, and B t denotes the standard Brownian motion. Then (see Borodin and Salminen, 1996, p. 233, Formula 3 .0.1)
. By differentiating this expression with respect to b at b ¼ 0 we find, wherẽ
is the expected time to the first adjustment.
Appendix C. Approximation formulas
Given the weak assumptions we impose on the stochastic processes, explicit formulas are difficult to obtain. However, we can derive some approximate formulas that may provide useful intuition for how the model works, and to get some sense of the numerical magnitudes that are involved.
We will first explore the effect on the payoff of a player from a marginal reduction in his threshold. Let players A and B have thresholds r 1 4 1 and r B o 1. Consider the situation at T 1 when RðT 1 ; oÞ=ZðT 1 ; oÞ ¼ r 1 . If player A sticks to the threshold r 1 , there will be an immediate adjustment at T 1 . In contrast, if player A adopts a new threshold r 2 o r 1 , there will be an adjustment at T 2 , where T 2 denotes the first time after T 1 where R=Z has decreased at least by a factor r 2 =r 1 , or increased at least by a factor r B =r 1 . Formally
Considering the payoffs associated with selecting the threshold r 2 , when we let r 2 converge to r 1 from below, we obtain the effect of a marginal reduction in r 1 . The limit of the ratio of R=Z is then
Define v B ðr A ; r 1 Þ correspondingly. Assume there is a Gaussian component in either Z or Q, i.e., that either a z 40 or a q 40. Then a well-known property of Gaussian processes implies that when r 1 is reached, the probability of reaching r B before r 2 , converges to zero when r 2 -r 1 À. Furthermore, the expected time until r 2 is reached converges to zero, i.e., Thus, v A is quite insensitive with respect to variation in r B . (The more volatile the ratio R=Z is, and the closer r 1 and r B are to 1, the more v A ðr 1 ; r B Þ is sensitive with respect to variation in r B .) We do not have equality in the limit when r 2 -r 1 ; since with probability zero, the time T 2 ðr 2 =r 1 ; r B =r 1 ; oÞ is positive and in this time period we have that Rðs; oÞ=Zðs; oÞ4r 2 and Rðs; oÞ=Zðs; oÞ may reach r B before r 2 . In this approximation we neglect the possibility that T 2 does not vanish in the limit. To obtain some intuition for these expressions, consider the case with time invariant adjustment outcome, Z ¼ 1, implying that m n;z ¼ 0. If in addition, Z A ¼ 1 and Z B ¼ À 1, then (C.5) and (C.6) read u A % r A =b þ t A and u B % 1=ðr B bÞþt B , which can be rearranged to r A % ðu A À t A Þb and 1=r B % ðu B À t B Þb.
The following heuristic argument explains these expressions: By renegotiating the contract, a player incurs the adjustment fee, and then obtains the expected utility after an adjustment, u n . Multiplying by the discount rate b, we obtain the equivalent flow payoff. A player should demand an adjustment when the real contract payment equals the equivalent flow payoff from requiring an adjustment, i.e., the critical thresholds are given by these formulas.
These approximations imply that the volatility only influences the thresholds through the expected objective functions u n: These relations may be useful in order to find the optimal thresholds. Comparing with the numerical simulations in Section 4, these approximations underestimate u A and u B by about 2 percent. The approximation is better the smaller the volatility in Z and Q.
Appendix D. Proofs
We have the following three technical results that are proved at the end of this section.
Lemma D.1. The real adjustment outcome model Z satisfies
We need the following definitions before we may state the next lemma. Let
where Rð0; oÞ=Zð0; oÞ ¼ r 1 and T 1 ¼ inffs 40jRðs; oÞ=Zðs; oÞ= 2ðr A ; r B Þg:
In this definition we assume Zð0; oÞa1 in order to simplify the expressions. Further, define P t as the probability for passing the boundary r t at t ¼ T 1 , i.e., Proof of Theorem 2.1. The objective function may be written
The expected value of integral in the last expression above is bounded due to property F . Then EfU n g is bounded if the number of adjustments is finite.
If there is an infinite number of adjustments, it is in addition necessary to bound
This expression is bounded due to property F .
When both t A ; t B 4 0, neither player benefits from requiring adjustment immediately all the time, e.g., have a critical threshold equal to 1. Hence the problem is well-defined.
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Let T satisfy t i oTrt i þ 1 . Define C T as the contribution to the objective function for t oT that cannot be changed when tZT, that is,
R Z n ðs; oÞexpðÀbsÞ ds
ðD:2Þ
and H n ðt i þ 2 À t i þ 1 ; . . . ; oÞ as the contribution to the object function after t i þ 1 , that is,
The function H n ðt i þ 2 À t i þ 1 ; . . . ; oÞ has the same distribution as U n ðt 0 ; . . . ; oÞ. Then we may write the objective function as U n ðt 1 ; . . . ; oÞ ¼ C T þZ Z n ðT; oÞexpðÀbTÞ R Z n ðT; oÞ Z Z n ðT; oÞ
The ratios Rðs; oÞ=RðT; oÞ and Zðt i þ 1 ; oÞ=ZðT; oÞ are independent of RðT; oÞ and ZðT; oÞ due to the Markov properties. The future contribution to the object function depends on RðT; oÞ and ZðT; oÞ, but the optimal strategy is only a function of the ratio RðT; oÞ=ZðT; oÞ and there is no memory in the game, i.e., dependencies on t j o T, Rðs; oÞ for s oT or Zðs; oÞ for s o T. 
ðD:5Þ
Lemma D.1 gives
Combining these implies
ðD:7Þ
This expression is used in order to show that u A is increasing in r B and that u B is decreasing in r A . Lemma D.2 states that F A ðr 1 ; r A ; r B Þ increases in r B and F B ðr 1 ; r A ; r B Þ decreases in r A . The second term has the same sign since h A is decreasing in r B and h B is increasing in r A .
(ii) Theorem 3.1 states that f n , h n , and u n are continuous. To simplify the expressions below, define the expected value of the objective functions of each of the players, given optimal play by this player, as Let r B 41 be fixed. We will first prove that there is a value 0rr A o1 that maximizes u A ðr A ; r B Þ. The function u A ðr A ; r B Þ is defined for 0rr A o 1. We will give an argument that the maximum value is attained for r A in the closed interval ½0; 1 À e for e40 sufficiently small. Since the interval is closed, the maximum value will be attained for a value r A ¼ m A ðr B Þ.
If Z or Q have a Brownian term, then Tðr A ; r B Þ vanishes with probability 1 when r A -1. Then h A ðr A ; r B Þ-1 and f A ðr A ; r B Þ-0 when r A -1. Furthermore the expression (5) for u A implies that u A ðr A ; r B Þ-À 1 when r A -1. If there are only jumps in ZQ, then Tðr A ; r B Þ does not necessarily vanishes with probability 1 when r A -1. 
where C T 1 is defined in (D.2). As noted above, W 1 ¼ W 2 are identical except if r 1 is reached. Since the probability that r 1 is reached before r B is P r 1 , the difference is
Lemma D.1 is used in the second equality. Define the limit of the discounted real adjustment outcome when the lower threshold is slightly reduced by
Due to the Markov property and property F , the numerator is monotone and hence the limit is well-defined. Letting r 2 -r 1 , we have 
We have that lim for r 1 o 1. We have Rð0; oÞ=Zð0; oÞ ¼ r 1 and Rðs; oÞ=Zðs; oÞ 2 ðr A ; r B Þ for s oT 1 : We may split in two cases; that there exists s o T 1 such that Rðs; oÞ=Zðs; oÞZr 0 for s oT 1 or R Z n ðs; oÞ=Z Z n ðs; oÞor 0 for all s o T 1 : Let P 0 denote the probability for the first case, and let T 0 oT 1 denote the corresponding time if this happens. We define r 0 such that 
